

PAKE-based mutual HTTP authentication for preventing phishing attacks

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■ Our proposal

new mutual authentication protocol for Web systems which is

- Secure
 - detecting phishing websites reliably
 - Both *users* and *servers* are authenticated
 - no password information leaks
 - for false websites
 - offline dictionary attack impossible
- (↔DIGEST auth, PwdHash:
>20 chars required for password secrecy)

- Easy to use
 - using human-memorable passwords only
 - no need for personal secret storage (↔TLS client auth., password reminders)

- Generic
 - no whitelist (↔EV SSL)
 - no blacklist (↔IE/Firefox phishing warnings)
 - not site-specific

★ Aiming for long-term solution:
 ■ future replacement for form-based auth.

Three possible phishing attacks:


1. steal user's password sent
2. imitate successful login
 - to steal user's privacy data afterwards
3. check password's validity
 - by forwarding it to the genuine site (man-in-the-middle attack)

■ Technology

- Adopting PAKE for Web authentication
 - Mutual auth. with weak secret (password)
 - Password information is not leaked at all
 - Offline dictionary attack impossible
- Naturally extending RFC2617
 - Drop-in replacement for BASIC/DIGEST
 - Replacement for form-based authentication in web applications
 - Relying on TLS for secrecy of payload
 - Assume transport/DNS security
- Host-name based detection of phishing
 - avoiding man-in-the-middle phishing

■ Protocol details

- Based on ISO-defined variant of PAKE protocol (ISO 11770-4 KAM3)
 - Password is combined with hostname as "weak secret" to prevent MIM attack.
 $\pi = H(\text{password}, \text{host})$
- Computational cost similar to TLS
 - Single public-key op. for 1st access
 - A few hash op. for 2nd access & more



■ UI consideration

- Entry field must be protected from image-based forgeries
 - no popup dialog (↔ BASIC/DIGEST auth.)
 - e.g. use toolbar area (see above)
- Auth. status must be indicated
 - to prevent imitated auth. success

■ Current status

- Plugin for Apache server implemented
- Test Firefox extension implemented
 - Full implementation is about to start
- Internet-Draft in preparation

■ Future Plans

- Field test in a part of Yahoo! Japan
- Distribution of open-source modules

■ Related Work

- EV-SSL ... relies on central authorities
- Passpet ... requires private key storage
- PwdHash
 - Similar hostname-based mangling
 - Weak against offline attacks