

ACTAS: A System Design for Associative and Commutative Tree Automata Theory

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Abstract

ACTAS is an integrated system for manipulating associative and commutative tree automata (AC-tree automata for short), that has various functions such as for Boolean operations of AC-tree automata, computing rewrite descendants, and solving emptiness and membership problems. In order to deal with high-complexity problems in reasonable time, over- and under-approximation algorithms are also equipped. Such functionality enables us automated verification of safety property in infinite state models, that is helpful in the domain of, e.g. network security, in particular, for security problems of cryptographic protocols allowing an equational property. In runtime of model construction, a tool support for analysis of state space expansion is provided. The intermediate status of the computation is displayed in numerical data table, and also the line graphs are generated. Besides, a graphical user interface of the system provides us a user-friendly environment for handy use.

Key words: term rewriting, AC-tree automata, verification, cryptographic protocols

1 Introduction

Tree automata are the counterpart of finite automata for strings, in the sense that they inherit most of the properties holding for finite automata. It is known that *tree languages* recognized by tree automata are closed under Boolean operations and most of the decidability results are positive [4]. The tree automata framework is useful in dealing with trees (i.e. terms), and

*The proceedings of RULE 2004 is published in
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
URL: www.elsevier.nl/locate/entcs*

several verification techniques based on the tree automata theory have been studied [5,7]. For instance, Kaji *et al.* pointed out in [8] that several important cryptographic protocols can be modeled by *term rewriting systems* (TRS for short, [2]) and tree automata, and moreover, the positive decidability results and closure properties of tree automata allow us to design an automated deduction technique for reasoning about the security problems.

In fact, verification tools for security protocols have been developed by using tree automata framework [1,3]. Genet and Viet Triem Tong provided a tree automata library, called *Timbuk* [5,6], in which associative and commutative properties of functions symbols are treated by using approximation. Rule-based approaches allowing associativity and commutativity have been also investigated, e.g. in [9].

Let us briefly explain below how to handle the model checking problem for infinite state transition systems in practice by using term rewriting and tree automata. We suppose that a TRS \mathcal{R} over the signature \mathcal{F} specifies the transition relation of a transition system \mathcal{M} . We say \mathcal{M} admits the transition step $s \rightarrow_{\mathcal{M}} t$ under an initial state space L if (1) $s = C[l\sigma]$ and $t = C[r\sigma]$ for some rewrite rule $l \rightarrow r$ in \mathcal{R} , context C and substitution σ , and (2) there is a state s_0 in L such that $s_0 \rightarrow_{\mathcal{M}}^* s$, where $\rightarrow_{\mathcal{M}}^*$ is the reflexive and transitive closure of $\rightarrow_{\mathcal{M}}$. One should notice that $\rightarrow_{\mathcal{M}} \subseteq \rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}}$. Namely, the domain of the system \mathcal{M} is the set of all ground terms over \mathcal{F} , and the state space of \mathcal{M} to be verified is the reachable states from L by \mathcal{R} . We suppose that the initial state space L can be represented by some tree automaton \mathcal{A} , in such a way that $t \in L$ if and only if t is accepted by \mathcal{A} . So, in this setting, given a rewrite system and a tree automaton specifying each of \mathcal{M} and L , the reachable state space of a transition system is considered to be defined. In the paper, we denote by $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$ the set of elements accepted by a tree automata \mathcal{A} , and by $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}))$ the set of reachable states.

Let P be some subset of the domain of \mathcal{M} , that consists of states to which we do not allow \mathcal{M} to admit the transition step from any initial state in L . For instance in the network protocols, P is the set of private information, L is the initial knowledge of the intruder, and \mathcal{R} is the intruder's possible operations. So the information obtainable by the intruder can be represented by $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}}^*](L)$, and thus, the intersection of P and $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}}^*](L)$ contains a private information that is reachable somehow by the intruder. In other words, the non-emptiness of the intersection indicates that the protocol is *not* secure.

However, the set $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}}^*](L)$ of reachable states is not a regular tree language even if L is a regular tree language. Even worse, it is not computable in general. A tree language L is called *regular* if there exists a tree automata \mathcal{A} such that L is recognized by \mathcal{A} . To overcome the above problem there have been several studies, such as: (1) to find a subclass, i.e. sufficient conditions, of \mathcal{R} in which regularity is preserved, and (2) to extend the tree automata framework so that a wider class of tree languages can be handled. Decidable subclasses of such TRS that effectively preserve regularity have been investigated in [16,17].




Fig. 1. Control panel of ACTAS

Regarding the second approach, it is known that regularity is not AC-closed. Precisely, the AC-closure of a regular tree language is no longer regular. A binary function symbol f in a signature \mathcal{F} is *associative and commutative* if the following axioms are assumed:

$$f(x, f(y, z)) = f(f(x, y), z) \quad f(x, y) = f(y, x)$$

The AC-closure of a tree language L is, given a subset \mathcal{F}_{AC} of the binary function symbols in \mathcal{F} , a set $\{t \mid \exists s \in L. s =_{AC} t\}$. Here $=_{AC}$ denotes the equivalence relation induced by AC-axioms of all function symbols in \mathcal{F}_{AC} . The above negative observation reveals that for modeling a cryptographic protocol allowing equational property like Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the reachable state space can not be handled by the standard tree automata.

In this research we take the second approach. We proposed in [14] an extension of tree automata, called *equational tree automata*. We also showed in [11,12] that under certain useful equational axioms, e.g. associativity and/or commutativity, tree languages accepted by the equational tree automata are closed under Boolean operations. Moreover, in this extended framework the previous Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol can be handled, and even the verification process is automatable [13].

The AC-tree automata simulator (ACTAS) is a tool for the computation of tree automata allowing that some of the binary function symbols are associative and commutative. A screen shot of this system is presented in Fig. 1.

The class of AC-tree automata is effectively closed under union and intersection, and the membership and emptiness problems are decidable. In regular case, the emptiness test is solvable in linear time. The decidability

result of emptiness problem for *non*-regular case is also positive, however, it is not manageable in the sense of real computation, that can be observed by the fact that the reachability of a Petri-net instance is known to be EXPSPACE-hard and non-regular AC-tree automata are in some sense a generalization of Petri-nets. Therefore we designed in ACTAS over- and under-approximation algorithms, for efficiently computing rewrite descendants $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/\text{AC}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}))$ of a given AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC and AC-TRS \mathcal{R}/AC .

2 AC-Tree Automata

We begin this section by introducing AC-tree automata. We then explain how to operate ACTAS as a tool for manipulating AC-tree automata and even as a tool for supporting automated verification.

A *tree automaton* (TA for short) \mathcal{A} is a 4-tuple $(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{Q}_{\text{fin}}, \Delta)$, whose components are the *signature* \mathcal{F} , i.e. a finite set of function symbols with fixed arities, a finite set \mathcal{Q} of special constant symbols, called *states*, with $\mathcal{F} \cap \mathcal{Q} = \emptyset$, a subset \mathcal{Q}_{fin} of \mathcal{Q} whose elements are called *final states*, and a finite set Δ of *transition rules* in one of the following forms:

$f(p_1, \dots, p_n) \rightarrow q_1$	(TYPE 1)
$f(p_1, \dots, p_n) \rightarrow f(q_1, \dots, q_n)$	(TYPE 2)
$p_1 \rightarrow q_1$	(TYPE 3)

such that $f \in \mathcal{F}$ with $\text{arity}(f) = n$ and $p_1, \dots, p_n, q_1, \dots, q_n \in \mathcal{Q}$. In TYPE 2 the root function symbols of the left- and right-hand sides must be the same. Transition rules in TYPE 3 are called ϵ -rules (“epsilon-rules”). A TA \mathcal{A} is called *regular* if Δ consists only of rules in TYPE 1. Rules of TYPE 2 are not treated in [4]. Under consideration of equational properties, however, TYPE 2 is essential in the sense that, e.g. recognizable tree languages of our definition have a bijective correspondence to the word language hierarchy [11]. An efficient algorithm for the intersection of such AC-tree automata, presented in [14], is also one of the advantages.

A transition move $\rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}}$ is the rewrite relation \rightarrow_{Δ} by taking Δ as a TRS Δ over the signature $\mathcal{F} \cup \mathcal{Q}$. A ground term t over \mathcal{F} is *accepted* if $t \rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}}^* q_f$ for some $q_f \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{fin}}$. The set of terms accepted by a tree automaton \mathcal{A} is denoted as $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$. A tree language L , that is a subset of all ground terms, is *recognizable* if there is a tree automata \mathcal{A} such that $L = \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$.

An equational tree automaton is a pair of a tree automaton \mathcal{A} and an equational theory \mathcal{E} , denoted as \mathcal{A}/\mathcal{E} . The transition move is defined by the relation $\rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}}$ modulo \mathcal{E} . An AC-tree automaton is an equational tree automaton whose equational theory is the associativity and commutativity axioms for some of the binary function symbols in \mathcal{F} . The basic properties of AC-tree automata are stated below:

Theorem 2.1 [12,14] (1) *The class of tree languages recognizable with AC-*

tree automata are closed under union and intersection. (2) The class of tree languages recognizable with regular AC-tree automata are closed under Boolean operations. (3) The membership problem and the emptiness problem for AC-tree automata are decidable. \square

We consider the tree automaton \mathcal{A} with the following transition rules

$$a \rightarrow q_a \quad b \rightarrow q_b \quad f(q_a, q_b) \rightarrow q \quad f(q, q) \rightarrow q$$

with the final state q . Suppose f is associative and commutative, then the AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC accepts such trees t that

$$|t|_a = |t|_b$$

i.e. the number of occurrences of a is the same as the number of occurrences of b in the same tree t . One should notice that the above language is not recognizable with any tree automata.

In ACTAS the above AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC is specified as shown below:

```
[signature]
AC: f
const: a,b

[T-rule(q): A]
a -> q_a
b -> q_b
f(q_a,q_b) -> q
f(q,q) -> q
```

The signature of the term model is specified by declaring AC-symbols (e.g. `AC: f`) and also declaring constant function symbols (e.g. `const: a,b`). According to the syntax, the other constant symbols are recognized as state symbols. The tree automaton \mathcal{A} is specified in the second module, named \mathcal{A} , by listing the transition rules. The argument value q of `T-rule` is the final state of the tree automaton \mathcal{A} .

At the current implementation, ACTAS is equipped with the following functions for (i)–(ii) Boolean operations and (iii) rewrite descendants computation, and the two solvers for (iv) membership problem and (v) emptiness problem:

- (i) Given AC-tree automata \mathcal{A}/AC and \mathcal{B}/AC , construct an AC-tree automaton \mathcal{C}/AC such that $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{C}/AC) = \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/AC) \cup \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{B}/AC)$.
- (ii) Given AC-tree automata \mathcal{A}/AC and \mathcal{B}/AC , construct an AC-tree automaton \mathcal{C}/AC such that $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{C}/AC) = \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/AC) \cap \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{B}/AC)$.
- (iii) Given an AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC and an AC-TRS \mathcal{R}/AC whose rewrite rules do not contain AC-function symbols, construct AC-tree automaton \mathcal{C}/AC such that $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{C}/AC) = [\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/AC}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/AC))$.
- (iv) Given an AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC and a term t , determine whether $t \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/AC)$.

1: [signature]	7: [T-rule(q): A1]	13: [T-rule(q): A2]
2: AC: sum	8: $0 \rightarrow q_0$	14: $0 \rightarrow q$
3: const: 0	9: $q_0 \rightarrow q$	15: $s(q) \rightarrow q_1$
4:	10: $s(q_0) \rightarrow q_1$	16: $s(q_1) \rightarrow q$
5: [R-rule: R]	11: $\text{sum}(q_1, q_1) \rightarrow q$	17: $\text{sum}(q_1, q_1) \rightarrow q$
6: $0 \rightarrow s(s(0))$	12: $\text{sum}(q, q) \rightarrow q$	18: $\text{sum}(q, q) \rightarrow q$

Fig. 2. AC-rewrite descendant computation in ACTAS

(v) Given an AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC , determine whether $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}) = \emptyset$.

The computation results obtained by the operations (i)–(iii) can be re-used for new inputs. For automated verification, the above function (iii) is useful in order to construct models.

We consider the example in Fig. 2. The rewrite system \mathcal{R} consists of the single rewrite rule $0 \rightarrow s(s(0))$. The tree automaton \mathcal{A}_1 accepts a tree t if one of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) $t = 0$, (2) $t = \text{sum}(s(0), s(0))$, or (3) $t = \text{sum}(t_1, t_2)$ such that t_1, t_2 are accepted by \mathcal{A}_1/AC . Due to the declaration AC: sum, the binary symbol sum is associative and commutative. Thus, the above language coincides with $L = \{t \mid |t|_{s(0)} \text{ is even} \}$. This means t consists of the three components sum, 0, $s(0)$ and the number of occurrences of $s(0)$ in t is even.

We take $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_1/\text{AC}) (= L)$ as an initial state space, then the transition system induced by \mathcal{R}/AC satisfies that: s is an element in $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/\text{AC}}^*](L)$ if and only if $s = \text{sum}\{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$ such that $\sum_{i=1}^n \llbracket s_i \rrbracket$ is even, where $\llbracket 0 \rrbracket = 0$ and $\llbracket s(t) \rrbracket = \llbracket t \rrbracket + 1$. Namely, s is a term generated by \mathcal{R}/AC with \mathcal{A}_1/AC whenever the sum of natural numbers occurring in s is even. On the other hand, the tree language $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/\text{AC}}^*](L)$ can be represented by an AC-tree automaton, for instance, \mathcal{A}_2/AC defined in Fig. 2. But the advantage of using ACTAS is that we can construct an AC-tree automaton as a result of descendant computation.

One can observe that in constructing AC-tree automata by the fixpoint computation, the bounded computation is often required, because given an AC-TRS \mathcal{R}/AC and an AC-tree automaton \mathcal{A}/AC , (a) $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/\text{AC}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}))$ is *not* computable in general, and (b) even if $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/\text{AC}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}))$ is computable under a certain condition, it may not be recognizable with AC-tree automata. These two cases correspond to non-terminating computation.

From the above observation, in ACTAS, three parameters are arranged in the control panel. (See the lower left-hand corner in Fig. 1). PARAMETER 1 restricts the number of the execution of the outermost-loop in the algorithm: By setting PARAMETER 1 to be n (≥ 1) in function (iii), we can execute the rewrite descendant computation only of n -loops. In case that PARAMETER 1 is 0, the program checks whether a given ACTAS code is syntactically correct as no substantial computation occurs.

For computing over- or under-approximated results, we select appropriate positive integers for `PARAMETERS 2` and `3`. If non-left-linear rewrite rules like $f(x, x) \rightarrow x$ are included in the rewrite system, we need to check, in the algorithm of function (iii), whether tree automata $\mathcal{A}_{p_1} = (\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{Q}, \{p_1\}, \Delta)$ and $\mathcal{A}_{p_2} = (\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{Q}, \{p_2\}, \Delta)$ satisfy

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{p_1}/\text{AC}) \cap \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{p_2}/\text{AC}) \neq \emptyset$$

for some p_1, p_2 in \mathcal{Q} with $p_1 \neq p_2$. The values of `PARAMETERS 2` and `3` restrict the search depth and width of the decision procedure of the above question. But if `PARAMETERS 2` and `3` are the maximum 100, upper-bound limitation is ignored. That in turn results in the exact solution if the computation terminates. Hence, by selecting appropriate positive integers for `PARAMETERS 1–3`, one can obtain under-approximated results of $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}/\text{AC}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}))$ in reasonable time. On the other hand, by letting `PARAMETERS 2` and `3` be 0, it turns out over-approximated results.

3 Cryptographic Protocol Verification

We explain below how to verify network protocols by using ACTAS. In the protocol illustrated in Fig. 3, we write $E(x, y)$ for a message y encrypted by some key x , and $K(x)$ for a principal x 's secret key. The goal of this protocol is to send a secret message m from **alice** to **bob** without losing the secrecy. Hence m is encrypted with another secret key (nonce) r , and thus r is also encrypted and transferred to **bob**. In this network communication, **alice** first sends a triple of $E(K(\text{alice}), r)$, **alice** the sender's ID, and **bob** the receiver's ID. Then **server** reacts to this request by sending back $E(K(\text{bob}), r)$ to **alice**. At the final step **alice** sends the pair of $E(K(\text{bob}), r)$ and $E(r, m)$, to **bob**. The latter component is generated by encrypting m by r . The receiver **bob** can retrieve the clear-text m by decrypting $E(K(\text{bob}), r)$ first.




Fig. 3. A cryptographic protocol

Now we assume that an intruder **eve** has the following 4 abilities:

1. If **eve** knows x and $E(x, y)$, then **eve** also knows y ,
2. **eve** knows how to apply encryption and decryption functions E and D , i.e. if **eve** knows x and y , **eve** can construct $E(x, y)$ and $D(x, y)$,
3. **eve** knows its own secret key $K(\text{eve})$ and names of all the other principals, e.g. **alice** and **bob**,

1: [signature] 2: const: alice,bob,eve,m,r 3: var: x,y 4: 5: [R-rule: R_crypt] 6: d(x,e(x,y)) -> y 7: 8: [T-rule(q): A_initial] 9: d(q,q) -> q 10: e(q,q) -> q 11: 12: alice -> q 13: bob -> q 14: eve -> q	15: k(q_e) -> q 16: eve -> q_e 17: 18: e(q_ka,q_r) -> q 19: k(q_a) -> q_ka 20: alice -> q_a 21: 22: e(q_kb,q_r) -> q 23: k(q_b) -> q_kb 24: bob -> q_b 25: 26: e(q_r,q_m) -> q 27: m -> q_m 28: r -> q_r
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Fig. 4. Specification code of cryptographic protocol assuming wiretapping only

4. *eve* can wiretap the network channels, i.e. *eve* knows all information flowing in the network of Fig. 3.

To detect the security flaw (otherwise, to ensure the secrecy of the protocol), we verify the protocol by using TRS and tree automata. We first model by a tree automaton the initial knowledge of the intruder *eve*. We then generate the set of states reachable from the initial knowledge by the following TRS:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}} = \{ D(x, E(x, y)) \rightarrow y \}$$

The TRS $\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}$ corresponds to the above intruder's ability 1. The other assumptions 2–4, which are the intruder's initial knowledge and available operations, can be represented by the tree automaton $\mathcal{A}_{\text{initial}}$, that is shown in Fig. 4.

The tree automaton $\mathcal{A}_{\text{initial}}$ accepts a term t if and only if t is obtainable by the intruder without using the encryption-decryption axiom $\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}$. The set $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{initial}}))$ of reachable states corresponds to the fixpoint of the intruder's knowledge. By computing rewrite descendants (function (iii)), we have a tree automaton $\mathcal{A}_{\text{fixpoint}}$ that satisfies $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{fixpoint}}) = [\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{initial}}))$ if there exists. Therefore, by solving membership constraint (function (iv)) $m \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{fixpoint}})$?, it can be determined whether or not the protocol is secure against wiretapping.

Along the similar construction scheme, we can detect that the same protocol is *not* secure against impersonation. The associated tree automaton and TRS is illustrated in Fig. 5, that represents the previous protocol example in which intruder's active attack is assumed. By allowing that every principal

```

1: [signature]
2: const:  alice,bob,eve,m,r
3: var:    x,y,z
4:
5: [R-rule: R_crypt2]
6: d(x,e(x,y)) -> y
7: s(x,y,z) -> e(k(z),d(k(y),x))
8: s(x,y,z) -> x
9: s(x,y,z) -> y
10: s(x,y,z) -> z
11:
12: [T-rule(q): A_initial2]
13: d(q,q) -> q
14: e(q,q) -> q
15: s(q,q,q) -> q
16:
17: alice -> q
18: bob -> q
19: eve -> q
20: k(q_e) -> q
21: eve -> q_e
22:
23: s(q_kar,q_a,q_b) -> q
24: e(q_ka,q_r) -> q_kar
25: k(q_a) -> q_ka
26: alice -> q_a
27:
28: e(q_kb,q_r) -> q
29: k(q_b) -> q_kb
30: bob -> q_b
31:
32: e(q_r,q_m) -> q
33: m -> q_m
34: r -> q_r

```

Fig. 5. Specification code of cryptographic protocol assuming active attack

(including the intruder *eve*) sends a request to *server*, we add the rewrite rule

$$s(x, y, z) \rightarrow E(k(z), D(k(y), x))$$

and the transition rule $s(q, q, q) \rightarrow q$ to the previous code. In the left-hand side $s(x, y, z)$ of the rewrite rule, variables x, y, z are (intended to) assigned to encrypted data, sender's ID and receiver's ID, respectively. The result of this rewriting step is a server's reply, that is (assumed to be) received by a sender. More precisely, the sender receives an encrypted message $E(K(s_1), D(K(s_2), s_3))$, that is once decrypted with a sender's key at *server* site and the result is encrypted with a receiver's key. We assume also that *eve* can decompose any data of the form $s(t_1, t_2, t_3)$, and this situation is represented by the other three rewrite rules.

In the experiment, by using function (iii) of ACTAS with PARAMETER 1 to be 4 or the greater (and the others to be arbitrary positive integers), we obtain an under-approximated result. The numbers of transition rules and state symbols at each loop are shown in Fig. 6. This table together with the line graphs is generated automatically. We can save the displayed data as HTML format files (Fig. 7).

The resulting tree automaton accepts the secret message *m*, and thus, we know that the protocol is not secure. Actually, the protocol allows the following security flaw: The intruder *eve* first sends the tuple of $E(K(\text{alice}), r)$, *alice*,

loop	#(T-rule)	#(state)	time (sec)
0	18	9	—
1	30	16	3
2	41	16	12
3	44	16	22
4	44	16	32

Fig. 6. The numbers of transition rules and state symbols (loop 0–4)




Fig. 7. Tool support for state space analysis

eve to server. These elements are included in eve's initial knowledge due to the assumptions 3 and 4. Then eve obtains $E(K(\text{eve}), r)$ as a response from server. By the assumptions 2 and 3, eve creates $D(D(K(\text{eve}), E(K(\text{eve}), r)), E(r, m))$ that gives rise to m , because of $\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}$ that is the assumption 1.

4 Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange Protocol

The protocol illustrated below is called Diffie-Hellman key-exchange algorithm (e.g. Section 22.1, [15]):




Fig. 8. Diffie-Hellman key-exchange algorithm

In the figure $H(x, y)$ stands for the composition of data x and y , that is an integer $y^x \pmod{p}$ where p is given) in the real situation. To simplify the property of H , we assume in this model that H is implemented as $H(x, y) = p^{x+y} \pmod{q}$ where p, q are given). A secret key of a principal x is denoted by $K(x)$. The goal of this protocol is without losing the secrecy to share a session key by exchanging some data between the initiator (**alice** in the example) and the receiver (**bob**), and then to send from the initiator to receiver a message encrypted by the session key. The protocol consists of the three steps: **alice** first chooses a number r and sends it to **bob** together with an integer $H(K(\text{alice}), r)$. We suppose that no one else can retrieve $K(\text{alice})$ only from $H(K(\text{alice}), r)$. At the second step **bob** returns $H(K(\text{bob}), r)$ to **alice**. Because of the exponentiation in the implementation of H , one can assume that H is associative and commutative:

$$H(x, H(y, z)) = H(H(x, y), z) \quad H(x, y) = H(y, x)$$

Due to the first two steps, **alice** can generate $H(H(K(\text{bob}), r), K(\text{alice}))$ by combining $H(K(\text{bob}), r)$ and $K(\text{alice})$. The latter component is her secret key. Similarly, **bob** also generates $H(H(K(\text{alice}), r), K(\text{bob}))$ such that:

$$H(H(K(\text{alice}), r), K(\text{bob})) =_{\text{AC}} H(H(K(\text{bob}), r), K(\text{alice})).$$

Hence **bob** obtain the message m as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} D(H(H(K(\text{alice}), r), K(\text{bob})), E(H(H(K(\text{bob}), r), K(\text{alice})), m)) &=_{\text{AC}} \\ D(H(H(K(\text{bob}), r), K(\text{alice})), E(H(H(K(\text{bob}), r), K(\text{alice})), m)) &\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}} m \end{aligned}$$

The assumption of the protocol can be specified as the ACTAS code like in Fig. 9. In this setting we suppose that (a) the intruder **eve** can wiretap the network channels, but (b) **eve** does not actively attack to the protocol. Even if the binary function symbol H is associative and commutative, the AC-rewrite descendants can be computed by using the same algorithm of [16], because H does not appear in rewrite rules. But since the left-hand side of $\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}$ has multiple occurrences of the variable \mathbf{x} , the intersection-emptiness problem for AC-tree automata has to be dealt with in the algorithm.

```

1: [signature]
2: AC: h
3: const: alice,bob,eve,m,r
4: var: x,y
5:
6: [R-rule: R_crypt]
7: d(x,e(x,y)) -> y
8:
9: [T-rule(q): Assumption]
10: d(q,q) -> q
11: e(q,q) -> q
12: h(q,q) -> q
13:
14: alice -> q
15: bob -> q
16: eve -> q
17:
18: k(q_e) -> q
19: eve -> q_e
20: h(q_ka,q_r) -> q
21: k(q_a) -> q_ka
22: alice -> q_a
23: r -> q_r
24:
25: r -> q
26:
27: h(q_kb,q_r) -> q
28: k(q_b) -> q_kb
29: bob -> q_b
30:
31: e(q_kabr,q_m) -> q
32: h(q_kbr,q_ka) -> q_kabr
33: h(q_kb,q_r) -> q_kbr
34: m -> q_m

```

Fig. 9. Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol (assuming wiretapping only)

The intersection of AC-tree automata can be computed in ACTAS efficiently. However, the resulting AC-tree automata are no longer AC-regular in this efficient construction, and to solve the emptiness problem for non-regular AC-tree automata is EXPSPACE-hard [12].

In fact, when computing the exact solution fully automatically, it is nearly non-terminating computation. Then there are two choices for this example: the over-approximation algorithm (by setting `PARAMETER 2` to be 0) and the under-approximation (by choosing positive integers for `PARAMETERS 2` and 3).

Over-approximation. In this case, the result, that is an AC-tree automaton, is some superset of `eve`'s obtainable knowledge. Namely, if the secret message `m` is not accepted, the secrecy of the protocol is guaranteed. By taking the above input (Fig. 9), we obtain an AC-tree automaton as the output that accepts `m`. But then, it does not imply security flaw of the protocol. At the current implementation there is no option to refine the over-approximated result.

Under-approximation. In the full automation mode, the security flaw of the protocol is not detected either. This means that by taking several pairs of positive integers for `PARAMETERS 2` and 3, the under-approximated result is obtained, but none of the AC-tree automata that represents some subset of `eve`'s obtainable knowledge accepts the secret message `m`. Despite of this fact, we have another possibility to handle this protocol example in the AC-tree automata framework. The underlying idea of computing rewrite descendants

is, given a tree automaton $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{Q}_{fin}, \Delta)$, to find a rewrite rule $l \rightarrow r \in \mathcal{R}$ and an assignment $\rho = \{x_i \mapsto q_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ with $q, q_i \in \mathcal{Q}$ and $1 \leq i \leq n$ such that $l\rho \rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}}^* q$ but $r\rho \not\rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}}^* q$. Then we add new states and transition rules to \mathcal{A} , so that the newly obtained system \mathcal{A}'/AC satisfies $r\rho \rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}'/\text{AC}}^* q$. This process corresponds to one-step rewrite descendant computation for the case that $t \rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}} t'$ for some $t \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC})$ and $t' \notin \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}/\text{AC})$ such that $t/o = l\sigma$, $t' = s[r\sigma]_o$, $\rho = \sigma \downarrow_{\mathcal{A}/\text{AC}}$ (i.e. ρ is a normalized substitution of σ with respect to \mathcal{A}/AC). Furthermore, as an exceptional case in the above computation, non-left-linear rewrite rules are treated as follows. For instance, we consider the rule $f(x, x) \rightarrow x$ and take two (different) state symbols p_1 and p_2 , then we check whether

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}(p_1)/\text{AC}) \cap \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}(p_2)/\text{AC}) \neq \emptyset.$$

The above $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}(p_i)/\text{AC})$ is a tree language accepted by \mathcal{A}/AC whose final state \mathcal{Q}_{fin} is replaced by $\{p_i\}$. If the above question is positively solved, we take the different assignment $x \mapsto p_1$ and $x \mapsto p_2$ for the same variable x . Formally, non-linear variable x is replaced by x_1 and x_2 , and then define the substitution ρ containing the assignments $x_1 \mapsto p_1$ and $x_2 \mapsto p_2$.

Suppose \mathcal{A}_0/AC is the AC-tree automaton initially provided. Then the following statement is stated.

Lemma 4.1 *For each state symbols p and q of \mathcal{A}_0/AC , the intersection-emptiness of $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0(p)/\text{AC})$ and $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0(q)/\text{AC})$ is tested by solving finitely many membership problems.*

Proof. We suppose $p \neq q$, where q is the final state symbol of the AC-tree automaton in Fig. 9. By construction, $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0(p)/\text{AC})$ accepts only finitely many trees t_1, \dots, t_n , and t_1, \dots, t_n are effectively generated, due to König's Lemma e.g. in [10]. So, in this case, the intersection-emptiness is solvable by membership tests. The remaining case is obvious. \square

Membership function in the system assists us to perform the above test. In theory, membership problem for regular AC-tree automata is NP-complete (Corollary 4, [12]), but in this example, the size of trees is at most 9. This implies that all the possible combinations of p and q are computable in reasonable time. By using this result, the following property is correct.

Lemma 4.2 *Let p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 be state symbols of \mathcal{A}_0/AC such that*

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0(p_1)/\text{AC}) \cap \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0(p_2)/\text{AC}) \neq \emptyset,$$

then $d(p_1, e(p_2, p_3)) \rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}_0/\text{AC}}^ p_4$ if and only if $p_1 = p_2 = p_3 = p_4 = q$.* \square

Theorem 4.3 *The tree language $[\rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}_{\text{crypt}}/\text{AC}}^*](\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0/\text{AC}))$ is recognizable with \mathcal{A}_0/AC .* \square

Therefore $\mathcal{A}_0/\mathcal{AC}$ is already the fixpoint, namely, the protocol is secure against wiretapping, because m is not in *eve*'s initial knowledge $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_0/\mathcal{AC})$.

Regarding the active attack by assuming impersonation, the security flow of the protocol is noted in [15]. For instance, this protocol allows the following attack:




Fig. 10. Man-in-the-middle attack in Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol

Acknowledgments. The authors thank the three anonymous referees for their numerous comments and suggestions to improve the early version of the paper.

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